Europe alleges that Russia’s “shadow fleet” cut the cables carrying electricity and internet traffic under the Baltic Sea. The sabotage is believed to have been carried out with the aging Eagle S ship, suspected to be used to transport embargoed Russian petroleum products. The diverse capabilities of Russia, including deep-working submarines equipped with manipulative weapons and titanium hulls, point the arrows towards Putin’s secret weapon. Employees of the Finnish electricity company Fingrid noticed damage to the main submarine power cable connecting Finland to Estonia shortly after noon on Christmas Day 2024, causing a significant decrease in Estonia’s electricity supply.
The BBC reported on the debate surrounding the possibility of sabotage against the cables. That evening, Arto Pahkin, Fingrid’s grid operations director, was quoted by Finland’s national broadcaster as saying, “We have various investigative lines from sabotage to technical failure, and nothing has been ruled out yet. At least two ships were moving near the cables during the disruption.”
Hours later, a Finnish coast guard team boarded the Russian ship Eagle S and directed it to Finnish waters. The ship was suspected of intentionally damaging the main power cable named Estlink 2.
The European Union claims that the ship, registered to the Cook Islands, is actually part of “Russia’s shadow fleet.” The aging tanker is believed to be used to transport embargoed Russian petroleum products. Finnish police believe that the Eagle S may have dragged the anchor along the seabed. While reports indicate that an anchor was found at depths of up to 80 meters along the route of Eagle S, photos taken after the incident revealed that the anchor on the starboard side of the ship was missing.
The Finnish police announced the presence of nine suspects in the criminal investigation into the cable damage. The damage to the 170-kilometer-long Estlink 2 cable signals the latest incident in a series of underwater cable damages or complete cuts in the Baltic region since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine three years ago.
Following the Estlink 2 incident, NATO pledged to increase its military presence in the Baltic Sea, while Estonia sent a patrol ship to protect the submarine power cable Estlink 1. The EU stated that the damage to the submarine cable was the latest in a series of suspicious attacks targeting critical infrastructure. Approximately 600 submarine cables spread across vast oceans and seas, carrying electricity and information.
These cables, which mostly terminate in secret locations, connect people over 1.4 million kilometers. The majority of these cables are responsible for almost all data and internet traffic.
Analysts say that accidental damage or human error is always a possibility, but the prospect of sabotage remains on the table. Moscow’s hostility towards Europe has led Western governments to conclude that Russia’s military intelligence service may have launched a systematic covert attack campaign against countries assisting Ukraine. Dr. Sidharth Kaushal, a senior research fellow in maritime power at the Royal United Services Institute based in Whitehall, stated, “Submarines that dive deep can sever cables at depths that make repairs extremely difficult. They can also eavesdrop on sensitive submarine cables.”
Kaushal added, “Targeting maritime infrastructure along with terrestrial infrastructure in a conflict with NATO will be a key part of a wider campaign intended to gradually erode Western public support for Russia.” The Russian military, according to Kaushal, has a “highly layered structure.”
In Kaushal’s view, operations in shallower waters are the responsibility of Spetsnaz (Special Forces), GRU (Military Intelligence), and the Russian Navy. However, the task of deep-sea intelligence gathering and sabotage operations is directly handled by the Ministry of Defense and the Main Directorate for Deep Sea Research (GUGI), which reports to President Putin himself.
Kaushal mentions that GUGI uses surface ships for surveillance and intelligence gathering operations, such as mapping the locations of offshore wind farms or where cables come ashore. However, for deep-sea missions, they rely on “motherships” like the Belgorod, former nuclear ballistic missile and cruise missile submarines. The Russians have a wide range of capabilities, including titanium-hulled submarines that can operate at depths of thousands of meters and are equipped with manipulative weapons.
This three-person crew typically consists of highly experienced former naval officers who have undergone training as rigorous as astronauts. Even for the U.S. Navy, knowing exactly what is placed on the seabed at such depths or what these deep-sea divers are doing is extremely challenging.